This article revisits the debate on the contribution of NGOs to the democratic legitimacy of international law. While the primary focus of this debate seems to be on the question of whether or not NGOs are a justifiable source for the democratic legitimacy of international law, there is little consensus on the meaning, interpretation, and scope of democratic legitimacy. This is troublesome as their different-often-implicit-interpretations of democratic legitimacy influence the ways scholars validate NGOs. In this article I offer a threefold classification of the conceptions of democratic legitimacy that seem to underlie the debate: universalistic versus particularistic approaches, institutionalist versus non-institutionalist approaches, and uniform versus multiform approaches. The classification of these different approaches aims to invite scholars to first engage in the fundamental debate on how democratic legitimacy should be theorised in the context of international law in order to address each other's arguments at the same conceptual level.
internationally active NGOs. A large number of the NGOs that scholars generally refer to when discussing their merits for the democratic legitimacy of international law are transnationally organised. These NGOs function and participate in networks in ways that extend across the boundaries of two or more states, linking political systems, economies, and societies. 10 In this article I examine the NGO democratic legitimacy thesis. In section 2, I start with an overview of the debate. This helicopter view on the assumed contributions of NGOs to the democratic legitimacy of international law, and the accompanying opposing views allows me to detect conceptual incompatibilities in the debate. These incompatibilities often remain hidden in the current debate, as scholars tend to single out one specific merit or weakness of NGOs.
In section 3, in an attempt to explain these conceptual incompatibilities, I will point out the lack of uniformity in the definitional concepts on which both sides of the debate seem to base their assessment of NGOs. The concept of democratic legitimacy is the central object of ambiguity. Democratic legitimacy is such a common term, that scholars scarcely explicitly address what they understand it to mean. This is problematic as their implicit but diverging views on what democratic legitimacy of international law entails, bar a constructive debate on what exactly the contributions of NGOs can be. In an attempt to facilitate future discussions on the NGO democratic legitimacy thesis, I distinguish three underlying causes of the variations on democratic legitimacy.
In section 4, I conclude with a classification of these variations of democratic legitimacy that characterise the debate. This classification is intended to function as an incentive for scholars to be more explicit about their conceptual starting points while advocating or dismissing the NGO democratic legitimacy thesis. In order to gain a deeper understanding of the alleged contributory roles of NGOs and on the persistent controversy around NGOs, one cannot but address the principled discussion on how democratic legitimacy should be adopted in the international legal order.
The debate-what to make of the NGO democratic legitimacy thesis?
In the past three decades, the idea that NGOs offer solutions to some of the democratic deficits of international law has gained popularity. deficits are primarily caused, as the narrative goes, by the waning autonomy of states and by some intrinsic deficits of state consent, due to, among other reasons, limited parliamentary scrutiny and inequality among states. The generally acclaimed role of civil society to democratically legitimize domestic law is based on a long tradition in democratic thought. 12 However, for an understanding of what constitutes legitimate international law, the emphasis on non-state actors points towards a shift in thinking compared to the traditional doctrine of state consent. 13 Although there is no single, shared narrative that explains the significance of NGOs for the democratic legitimacy of international law, most scholars seem to rely on the ideal of an international participatory democracy in order to give individuals opportunities to express their views on international law. 14 The NGO democratic legitimacy thesis has been challenged. According to its opponents the scholarly appreciation of NGOs as the saviours of democratic legitimacy is misleading. Although international organisations might allow NGOs to express their opinions, the opportunity for NGOs to enrich deliberations depends heavily on the-in their view naïve-assumption that international organisations (including states) truly function as a neutral mediator of all presented interests. 15 Additionally, the image of NGOs as representatives leads to criticism, 16 as does the indeterminacy of how, and whether the concept of civil society can be translated to the international level. 17 This section categorises the main arguments that characterise the NGO democratic legitimacy thesis. First, it discusses the arguments, and counterargument, that NGOs bring about voices, knowledge and social engagement.
Second, it examines one of the main criticisms on the thesis: the alleged lack of internal legitimacy of NGOs.
Voice, knowledge and social engagement
One can distinguish three generally acknowledged contributions of NGOs to the democratic legitimacy of international law: a voice, knowledge, and social engagement. The promise of giving the people a voice in international lawmaking by allowing NGOs to participate is based on the assumption that NGOs articulate their aspirations. 18 NGOs are perceived as political actors contributing to the democratic principle of self-rule. 19 They are supposed to offer the vital link between the local and the global. 20 The fact that many NGOs are transnationally organised allows them to complement the allegedly incomplete representation of citizens by states. Being privately organised and connected to a large network and constituency, NGOs are considered especially sensitive to outcast voices, whereas states are often criticised for disregarding these minority viewpoints. 21 Besides giving voice to the marginalised peoples, NGOs also highlight issues to law-making institutions that are otherwise scarcely given any attention. Within a 'favourable political opportunity structure', 22 as it is stated, a pluralist model of interests contributes to opening up the agenda and formal communications of international law-making for the wider public, which in turn contributes to expanding the opportunities of affected peoples to get involved. 23 NGOs' institutional participation is framed as a specific instruction to the international legislator; law-making processes should be inclusive, with room for multiple perspectives. 24 Opponents find it more realistic to conclude that NGOs are primarily invited by international organisations to provide a certain form of window dressing. The accreditation of NGOs is seen as a strategic move of the relevant international organisation to strengthen the credentials of international lawmaking in order to justify pre-rationalized decisions. 25 The offered opportunities for NGOs to participate can only lead to a 'closed legitimation-circle between global civil society and international organizations'.
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Some proponents primarily emphasise the merits of the participation of NGOs for the knowledge base of both the international organisations and the governmental officials taking part in international law-making. 27 Their participation allegedly strengthens the deliberative practices internationally. NGOs provide a mechanism for filtering information and pooling resources, to bring in competing perspectives and information. This contribution is found to be essential for law-making processes, especially for those characterised by highly technocratic and specialised issues.
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These arguments primarily value the effects of NGOs on the output of the legislative processes. Instead of the earlier focus on the strengthening of political participation in se, which is related to a democratic right belonging to people individually, in this reading, NGOs' involvement has the more general purpose to strengthen the rationality of legislative procedures and therefore its democratic legitimacy. While NGOs are mostly kept on the sidelines when the final definition and adaptation of international legal texts occur, they are active participants in prior preparatory discussions.
Dryzek is one of the main proponents of deliberative practices for democratically legitimising international law. He focuses on international discourses that coordinate behaviour of individuals, and turn into social as well publications/274/the-democratic-legitimacy-of-wto-law-on-the-dangers-of-fast-food-democracy/ (last visited November 2018). 25 as personal sources of order. 29 Due to the lack of democratic institutions, of 'institutional hardware' as he calls it, Dryzek argues that the balance of discourses in the international legal order is important. The larger variety of perspectives increases the chances of succeeding in a rational exchange of arguments, in reaching compromises and consensus. 30 Other proponents of the thesis argue that NGOs are to some extent the discourse. 31 They focus on their capacity to question and change discourses in order to contribute to the emerging, cascading and internalising of new international norms. 32 Compared to the sphere of states and their interactions, civil society is a realm of 'relatively unconstrained communication '. 33 NGOs are therefore considered to be ideally suited for challenging the positions taken in the debates concerning international law-making, and thus for dissent to be heard. 34 Closely related to these arguments is the contribution of NGOs to check executive powers. NGOs are considered to hold lawmakers accountable.
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According to Scholte, NGOs can 'provide a space for the expression of discontent and the pursuit of change when existing governance arrangements are regarded as illegitimate'. 36 NGOs are assumed to compensate for the lack of procedural rules and review mechanisms of the exerted international authority. 37 A part of their often self-imposed task is to check the legality of international law-making; whether the particular law-making authority is acting in line with its constitutive documents and stated policy positions. In addition, NGOs can assist those who suffer the consequences of international law in seeking redress. 38 Besides, NGOs that are accredited to participate in international law-making are believed to be able to detect, criticise but also correct current exclusionary practices by demanding more transparency and accountability. 39 This would encourage a wider public to proceed in public scrutiny activities.
In sum, proponents of the thesis argue that NGOs represent marginalised voices, provide expert knowledge to international law-makers, trigger debate, spread information, mobilise individuals, and contest states when they are not acting in congruence with international policy. 40 All these activities are supposed to improve international deliberations, which in turn are assumed to improve the quality of legislative texts and the democratic legitimacy of international law. 41 NGOs act as a surrogate for what is understood in a context of democratic states as the 'public' or 'counter publics'. 42 According to the critics, proponents of the NGO democratic legitimacy thesis often underestimate the complexity of transnational participation, deliberation and checks and balances. 43 Although NGOs might correctly criticise law-making practices, the way NGOs employ their activities can be provoking and intrusive too, negatively affecting the willingness of other participants to listen and be receptive to persuasion. And even when NGOs are formally invited to participate, exclusive practices might also arise internally when dominant participants define the terms of a discourse that are not shared by others. 44 The fact that NGOs have fixed positions based on their mission might obstruct, rather than facilitate any open debate. Besides, international governance is often accused of having an inherent Northern bias by excluding 'Southern' NGOs. 45 Because of these structural inequalities that allegedly characterise international law-making processes, some NGOs do not engage at all in the more formal deliberations but voice their dissent outside the setting of international organisations, deliberately choosing other political forums, including in the media and the street. 46 Besides, although in theory the requirement of an inclusive law-making process seems to be complementary to deliberative law-making, in practice it causes tension, as critics state. 47 The growth in numbers of NGOs seeking participation in the law-making processes of international organisations involves an 'openness dilemma': the more that international organisations are open to civil society, the more difficult it is to absorb the information channelled by NGOs and to benefit from their potential contribution in order to enrich the rationality of the debate. 48 The selection issue requires a constructive answer to the question of who should participate, why and how. As a result of the inefficiency in deliberations due to the growth in number of participants, government delegates have increasingly withdrawn behind closed doors. 49 Overcrowding equally causes a concern for NGOs, since allowing more participants implies a less substantive impact of their participation. Dealing with too much information might decrease the ability of lawmakers to focus on specific problems. This in turn creates space for strategic uses of information by participants and thus for new forms of domination. 50 Moreover, some critics refer to the 'second bite of the apple' thesis. 51 These scholars deem it far from clear that there is a democratic imperative in giving individuals opportunities to participate in global governance, as they already could enjoy these opportunities in their domestic democracies. 52 On this view, the participation of NGOs internationally is considered even detrimental to the democratic legitimacy of international law because it influences the state-based negotiations. 53 A biased representation by NGOs might negatively affect the current system of equality of states through state consent in international law-making. 54 Critics question if and how these different sorts of democratically legitimising forces should be combined. 55 Another recurring concern is the dependent position of NGOs towards international organisations and states. Not only do the accreditation mechanisms of international organisations imply a certain form of dependency, but the existing donor constructions that foresee financial support of NGOs also do. 56 The involvement of NGOs mirrors state power structures by furthering the bias in favour of agendas of the North. This could lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy: the current Northern bias in international organisations and their procedures might affect what type of NGOs feel attracted to participate. Others argue that the participation of NGOs is only accepted to assist the operationalisation of the law-making activities of international organisations.
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Besides the emphasis on the formal access of NGOs in international lawmaking arenas, some advocates of the thesis argue that NGOs encourage norm setting enacted in private, social, economic, and cultural arenas. NGOs create new transnational social spaces. 58 They are driving forces of change, by challenging the authority of states and international agencies as well as orthodox definitions of the 'political'. 59 In these arguments, NGOs are not considered to represent the marginalised voices or to enrich formal deliberations prior to the enactment of new international norms, but to 53 support the political action of marginalised groups from a local level up, so that those groups become strong enough to claim their equal share in lawmaking processes themselves.
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Allowing NGOs to participate in international law-making is alleged to have a spill-over effect upon the knowledge base of concerned individuals who are part of their broader network of contacts outside the political realm of international organisations. From this point of view, NGOs have the capacity to pass on knowledge, information, and expertise that assist individuals and communities to contribute to democratisation and the growth of a healthy civil society.
61 Some NGOs do so by making it their mission to enhance the education system in many countries. 62 Other NGOs circulate information specifically focused on the importance of democracy and democratisation are interrelated at both the national and international level. 63 Most of these scholarly writings reproduce the well-known premise that democracy needs a dynamic and independent civil society. NGOs, in this reading, help constitute a vibrant public sphere with a sufficient diversity of groups and opinions to generate public deliberation about different interests in international society. These arguments are in line with what is expected from civil society in national democracies: civil society is active in deliberation outside the state apparatus. They depend on political actors for possible influence on the political framework in order to be able to translate their spontaneous or 'communicative power' into political impact on decision-making. 64 The focus here is on the political action by civil society: the identification of collective problems and the influencing of political processes in order to translate public opinion into a legal rule. Whether the political action by NGOs occurs at a local, national, or regional level, it is considered to have positive effects for international democracy.
This line of reasoning implies a certain robustness of an international or global civil society that is critically assessed by opponents of the thesis. 65 They consider this concept of a global civil society extremely heterogeneous and fragmented and full of unequal relationships in terms of power and dependency. Besides, as is argued, one should critically assess if NGOs and civil society can be conceptually conflated. 66 Critics fear that the equation of NGOs and civil society often merely serves the supporters of politically progressive NGOs and social movements. 67 In addition, they point out a potential paradox in the alleged role of NGOs as facilitators of voices, knowledge and social engagement. Although interaction instigated by NGOs might lead to the desired empowerment of specific communities, it can also lead to a disempowering 'dependency' relationship between these communities and NGOs. 68 
Lack of internal legitimacy
The main criticism on the NGO democratic legitimacy thesis seems to concern the lack of accountability and representation of NGOs; what I call their 'internal legitimacy'. To gain authority to speak for other individuals or groups of individuals, NGOs should be internally organised in a democratic way. 69 This assumption can also be found in the ECOSOC rules on accreditation that require from NGOs a democratically adopted constitution.
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The criticism concerning the internal legitimacy of NGOs partly derives from a sense of 'practice what you preach'. 71 Most NGOs are particularly conscious of the lack of accountability and representation by states and international organisations. Therefore, they themselves should lead by example and are expected to prove that they have the authority to speak for those they intend to represent. 72 By pointing out that NGOs generally are not fully membership based, governed or financed, scholars problematise the accountability of NGOs. 73 It is considered questionable how public disempowerment, as we are familiar with in our parliamentary electoral systems, should take place. 74 The geographical scope of the constituency of NGOs is broad, scattered, and differently constituted than that of states or political representatives. 75 This makes critics question whether there is enough proximity of NGOs to the needs of the people whom they are supposed to represent. The detachment between NGOs and the people they purport to represent can in their view 'reinforce a global divide of wealth, mobility, information, and access to audience'. 76 NGOs allegedly act as self-appointed representatives. 77 In short, it is questioned how NGOs could foster any inclusive and equal law-making process, when they fail to truly represent affected individuals. More specifically, NGOs are criticised for representing the will of organised interests, of factions. 78 It is feared that NGOs, by representing special interests, take advantage of open decision-making processes in order to distort policy outcomes. 79 This criticism seems to originate from the classic issue of the unbalanced influence of factions on the exercise of public authority. NGOs' capability to carefully weigh different interests is questioned, not least because of the considerable self-interest of the organisations in pursuing pre-selected goals. 80 Scholars fear that participation of NGOs may give too much power to those with strong views, leading to insufficient attention to the public interest at large. 81 Besides, many of the NGOs that are engaged in international norm setting are often considered to represent states rather than affected individuals. 82 If independent, like the NGOs that are critical of their own state practices, or entirely eschew state-centric views, NGOs could pluralise the debate, detect exclusionary practices, and control governmental practices. 83 However, according to the critics, this independent position of NGOs is severely hindered by the cooperative nature of the relationship between some of the larger NGOs, states, and international organisations. 84 Being dependent on an accreditation before being able to participate in international law-making contradicts the assumption that NGOs form an independent opposition to governmental power and therefore establish a system of checks and balances at the international level. 85 NGOs are primarily considered to function as service providers, as policy analysts and expert advisors beneficial to governments. 86 These arguments relate to the fluid line between being invited to challenge the international exercise of authority, based on its possibly exclusionary law-making process, and being invited to support the international exercise of authority. 87 This fluidity is considered to limit the ability of NGOs to criticise the international law-making system from the outside. 88 In addition, a culture-related argument is often made in relation to the internal legitimacy of NGOs. Better organised, more powerful, and mostly Northern NGOs are considered to benefit from a geographical imbalance of interest representation in international law-making. 89 International NGOs in particular are criticised as representing elite groups exclusively. 90 Their international norm creating efforts are not vertical, as suggested by supporters of the thesis, but merely horizontal, taking place primarily among influential non-profit organisations. 91 In order to correct this imbalance, 'weak' and 'underdeveloped' civil societies necessitate measures to breathe life into local NGOs, often through donor practices. 92 However, this democratisation of domestic civil society groups through the support of international NGOs is criticised as being the experience of only a handful of countries. 93 The crux of the criticism on NGOs is that they claim to represent people without having received a form of authorisation from them. 94 
Democratic legitimacy as object of ambiguity
Standing alone, most arguments of both opponents and proponents of the thesis have merits. However, considered in conjunction, they confront us with irreconcilable differences in underlying conceptions of democratic legitimacy. This makes the divergence in the validation of the participation of NGOs in international law-making inevitable, at least to a certain extent.
The explanations of scholars as to how to conceive of NGOs in the international legal order are prompted by their incorporated theoretical mind-set. Some scholars take a moral, and others a more systematic stance towards democratic legitimacy. Some focus on the practical barriers to establishing democratic legitimacy by NGOs in international law-making practices. Others seem to doubt the value of the discussion entirely, given the 'intrinsic' democratic deficiencies of the international legal order itself. One can detect idealist solutions versus realist proposals, sovereignty proponents versus community thinkers, and ideas influenced by constitutional thinking versus pluralist thinking.
Compare for example the work of Kamminga and MacDonald on NGOs, with Anderson's opposition to the NGO democratic legitimacy thesis. Kamminga relies on a conception of democratic legitimacy based on pluralist interest representation, 95 whereas Anderson largely bases his criticism on the thesis on a conception of democratic legitimacy in which representation by NGOs is perceived in a political, liberal individualist sense. 96 Macdonald, on the other hand, explicitly rejects a narrow traditional approach to representation and broadens the scope of what she calls 'jurisdictional representation' with 'constitutive representation'. 97 These diverging conceptions of key elements of democratic legitimacy range from authority, representation, civil society, and participation, and evidently guide the validation of the role of NGOs and complicate the commensurability of the thesis.
The first and preliminary incompatibility refers to the level of application of the standard of democratic legitimacy. Most critics seem to be of the opinion that the application of democratic legitimacy as a standard should be limited to the political spectrum of the state. Democratic legitimacy is suggested to require a democratic system: a democracy. 98 This normative starting point questions if democratic features such as the expression of the will of the people are compatible with the international legal order. 99 As is argued, only at the state level can one find a demos, a people. And only when one can speak of a people, democratic legitimacy is relevant for testing the acceptability of authority. 100 In relation to international law-making this means that consent of states is a clear indicator for knowing that international laws, accorded by states, are based on the will of the affected people. 101 The second incompatibility in perspectives relates to the issue of normativity of international law. First, proponents of the thesis who identify problems with the democratic legitimacy of international law often contextualise international law in a very broad way. International law includes international agreements, statutes of international organisations, and standards set by a conglomerate of states, international organisations and private, non-governmental organisations. Some of these types of law-making exercises exceed the boundaries of the traditional doctrine of state consent. This seems to be the main motivation to reconsider the democratic legitimacy of international law. However, their opponents argue that these 'softer' forms of international rules do not require such a strong evaluation test. 102 The very justification of using democratic legitimacy is in their view exclusively related to the interfering and dominating characteristics of law, being binding and coercive upon its subjects. Second, other critics seem to even question the relevance of approaching international legal interactions as a political institution. 103 While they underline the importance of democratic legitimacy as a concept in se, their conception is inseparably related to the type of exercise of public authority that is exclusively found at the domestic level. Here it is not so much the characteristics of the law, but the characteristics of the nation state that are considered decisive for not applying the standard of democratic legitimacy to international law. These two perspectives share a basic trust in state-based institutions and conceptually disagree with the rise and relevance of the thesis in the first place. 104 Besides the alleged irrelevance of democratic legitimacy of international law, the participation of NGOs is therefore considered a disruption of the functioning of nation-state democracies themselves. 105 Consequently, discussants rarely meet substantively on the different issues that constitute the thesis, as it first requires an unlikely adaptation of their basic conceptions of democratic legitimacy. Any attempt to live up to one of the dominant points of criticism concerning NGOs' inadequate accountability and representation, for instance by strengthening the accountability structures and instruments of NGOs, is fruitless when the conception of representation to which critics adhere is based on a constituency relationship between the actor and the represented in a state-based democracy. 106 In addition, given the fact that most NGOs are neither membership-based organisations nor elected bodies, any discussion concerning their accountability requires fundamental reforms of their organisational structure in line with the critics' perception of representation, or an adaptation of the critics' conception of representation, and of democratic legitimacy fundamentally, which are both unlikely to happen.
Underlying the different appreciations of the NGO democratic legitimacy thesis one can detect three variations that might explain the principled disagreements concerning democratic legitimacy: universalism versus particularism, institutionalism versus non-institutionalism, and multiform approaches versus uniform approaches to democratic legitimacy.
Universalism versus particularism
The NGO democratic legitimacy thesis relies on the idea that democratic legitimacy is relevant wherever and whenever authority is exercised. Just like national law, international law has to derive from the people, 107 as it affects the capacity of individuals and groups to determine the conditions of their lives. 108 The difference in territorial level is relativised. 109 Here one detects an often implicit but strong and influential divide between scholars involved in the thesis, the universalism versus particularism divide. This divide relates to the perception that specific democratic norms have universal value versus the perception that democratic values are inseparably related to certain institutions or territorial spaces. 110 From a universalistic point of view, individuals, rather than peoples, states, or societies, constitute the basic ground for morality, regardless of the institutional character of an organisation that makes the laws. Any social construction needs to be justified with regard to individuals, irrespective of whether it consists of a small group of individuals or a large and institutionalised one. It implies an analysis in which the jurisprudence of democratic legitimacy is universal and applicable to all levels. 111 A positive reading of the NGO democratic legitimacy thesis requires such a universalistic outlook on the necessity to democratically legitimize international law. The need to engage in politics, and the significance of doing so, are considered omnipresent. Therefore, the interest of an individual in influencing decision-making could not be limited to certain spaces, but is defined by the impact of an authoritative decision on his or her life. A global democratic community should be acknowledged, and heard, that both includes and cuts across national democratic communities. The legislative work of UN agencies is compared to the exercise of public authority at the domestic level and is therefore considered an appropriate object of democratic legitimation. This approach relativises the importance of a sense of national belonging, which in the traditional doctrine of state consent is seen as a decisive condition for the existence of democratic legitimacy. 112 From the way they build up their arguments one can derive that critics seem to contest this claim of universality that presents democratic rights as rights for everyone, applicable everywhere. 113 They take a rather particularistic approach towards rights and values, 114 often based on a holistic view on democracy. Democracy is considered an institution, or set of institutions, achieved through electoral processes, and is closely associated with the ideas of a defined political community. This perspective rests strongly on the idea of a demos, and on the identification of international law as a voluntary association of democratic states. 115 The state, with its monopoly of force, establishes a unique institutional relationship between its citizens. 116 The existence of sovereign state power entails exceptional demands and exceptional obligations, which cannot be applied to any institution other than the state. 117 Underlying the different arguments made by critics one can sense a belief that that democratic legitimacy is not applicable to the world as a whole, unless one unified sovereign power would govern the world. As this is not the case, the sovereign state defines and delimits the people on whose behalf representatives act, and to whom they are accountable. 118 Only state authority, with its claim to a monopoly of coercive force, lends itself to an analysis in terms of democracy and democratic legitimacy. 119 This approach to states as primary lawmakers insists on the application of different principles to different types of entities. 120 The underlying assumptions of most critical work on NGOs seem to be based on such a particularistic approach. The necessary conceptual move of applying democratic legitimacy to another legal order than that of the nation-state is simply not supported. Although hardly acknowledged or discussed in the debate, the universalism-particularism divide is fundamental and preliminary to the NGO democratic legitimacy thesis. It concerns the question of the right level of application of democratic legitimacy as a standard for evaluating public authority.
to consider applying democratic legitimacy to international law coherentanother variation in approaches to democratic legitimacy manifests itself: the institutionalist versus non-institutionalist approach. At this stage, the scholarly perspectives seem to diverge on the manifestations of democratic legitimacy, instead of on the level of application.
In the work of proponents of the thesis one can find many references to non-institutional characteristics of democratic legitimacy such as a vivid democratic culture, a well-functioning public sphere and an active civil society. They seems to share a distinctive preference for more dynamic and informal approaches to democratic legitimacy and towards the international legal order at large, as opposed to a formal, institutional conception of democracy, law, and a legal order based on political rights and judicial safeguards. One can appreciate these non-institutional readings of democratic legitimacy as counter reactions to state-centric formalism that has dominated the international democracy debate for decades.
Take for example the discussion about international legal personality and NGOs. Proponents of the NGO democratic legitimacy thesis do not show any objection to theorising a role for non-state actors in international law-making despite lacking international legal personality. 122 However, more formal, institutionally oriented scholars perceive international legal personality as a determining factor in stipulating rights and duties of actors involved in international law-making. Given the asserted importance of international legal personality, these institution-oriented scholars perceive only states as relevant subjects and actors of international law-making. Any theory of a global public sphere leads to scepticism, as no juridical public exists internationally, nor a real public as we are familiar with in domestic democracies.
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Another example of the institutionalist versus non-institutionalist variation is the importance that is attached to the role of consent to the determination of international law. Institutionalist scholars are sensitive to the clarification of consent for understanding international obligations, while their non-institutionalist critics argue that law should be perceived as a matter of principle. In their view law is dependent on a particular reading of it; it is a matter of judgment or expertise. 124 This argumentation line brings us back to the discussed differences of perspectives towards the normativity of international law and the consequential need for democratic legitimate international law, as mentioned in the introduction of section 3. With regard to democratic legitimacy, a formal, institutional approach seems similar to the above-mentioned particularistic approach to democratic legitimacy. In an institutionalist approach to democratic legitimacy, scholars also often appreciate the sovereignty of states as the spill-over of liberal legal theory. However, instead of questioning the validity of applying democratic legitimacy outside the boundaries of a state, they emphasise the institutions such as political rights and judicial safeguards that states have at their disposal as necessary preconditions for any application of democratic legitimacy. 125 Proponents of the thesis seem to question whether such a formal conception of the international legal order does not shift too much from the basic unit of the public, which is the individual. 126 The international legal order is understood as a global community that both includes and cuts across national democratic communities. 127 Since the late 1990s onwards, scholars have come to perceive individuals as active participants, on occasion united in the formation of an NGO. In this reading, international law-making is far from static, with separate functional or territorial spheres in which actors have institutionalised positions. 128 A focus on less formal characteristics of the international legal order is favourable to their aim to restore missing dimensions of democracy that cannot be captured by 'one dimensional' approaches to democracy, characterised by a focus on nation-state electoral majorities. 129 International governance is considered to exercise public authority, although it does not fall easily into conventionally or nationally defined categories, and notwithstanding its 'soft' or 'liquid' appearances. 130 Such a non-institutionalist approach to the international legal order with a focus on informal elements related to democratic legitimacy, such as a vibrant public sphere, deliberation, and an active global civil society, seems to be primarily motivated by universalistic concerns regarding the lack of connection between those who establish international legal norms and individuals who are considered affected by the implementation of those norms. 
Uniform versus multiform approaches
One can also notice a difference in scholarly rigidity on the appearance of democratic legitimacy. This is in my view the third cause of variation in the NGO democratic legitimacy debate: some take a uniform approach to the appearance of democratic legitimacy and others a multiform approach.
Mostly the critics of the NGO democratic legitimacy thesis seem to adhere to a rigid conception of democratic legitimacy. The same standard of democratic legitimacy, with the same preconditions and manifestations should be used to whatever level of governance democratic legitimacy is applied. I call this the uniform approach to democratic legitimacy. This approach primarily contrasts with the view of proponents who rely on the idea that the way one applies democratic legitimacy to evaluate international law differs from the way one applies the democratic legitimacy to evaluate domestic law. I call this the multiform approach to democratic legitimacy. A multiform approach upholds a variable conception of democratic legitimacy, whose appearance might change according to the characteristics of the setting to which it is applied.
Scholars upholding a multiform approach conceive democratic legitimacy as a bundle of core values, practices, and procedural norms. There is a tendency to isolate these individual democratic practices and to presume that international law enjoys more democratic legitimacy if the law-making process has respected one of these values, practices or norms. A positive relationship between NGOs and one of these components is selectively emphasised. 132 Both approaches offer a different way out to a certain circularity that we are confronted with when discussing the democratic legitimacy of international law. As we are all aware, institutional democratic mechanisms, such as direct rights to participate or vote or an international parliament are nonexistent in the international legal order. 133 It is this lack of political rights and judicial safeguards internationally that probably has instigated proponents to conceptualise democratic legitimacy differently in terms of its manifestations. Most of the critics on the other hand, are fundamentally convinced that democratic legitimacy as a concept cannot change its appearance according to the level of governing, and therefore have no choice but to dismiss the NGO democratic legitimacy thesis entirely.
A classification
The three variations, as discussed in section 3, challenge the sentiment of genuineness and commensurability linked to the positions taken and set out in section 2. Skepticism towards a positive relationship between democratic legitimacy and NGO involvement is often instigated by a particularistic approach to concepts like democracy, justice, or legitimacy that rejects any universalistic approach to morality, or by a universalistic but institutionalist approach towards the manifestations of democratic legitimacy. At the other end of the spectrum, the 'social capital' arguments of scholars that adhere to a non-institutionalist approach to democratic legitimacy already hint at the shortcomings of state-centred approaches to democratic legitimacy. 134 The different conceptual starting points discussed often remain implicit in the debate on the NGO democratic legitimacy thesis. Participating scholars seldom explicitly acknowledge the fact that the assumptions informing their different stances in the NGO democratic legitimacy debate do not match.
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The discourse is characterised by isolated discussions on related themes such as whether NGOs represent people, whether a global civil society exists, whether NGOs are sufficiently accountable or whether international organisations offer sufficient space for Southern NGOs. In other words, the central issue often concerns whether or not NGOs are themselves defensible sources for the democratic legitimacy of international law. With this exclusive focus on NGOs, the meaning and appearance of democratic legitimacy as a concept is often presented as a given. This is problematic as it blurs the debate on the specific contributions NGOs may make, but it primarily distracts us from the main challenge of contemplating on how democratic legitimacy is, or should be, defined in the international legal order, necessary to uphold its critical potential to trace and address dominating exercises of international authority.
In order to facilitate any future discussions on the NGO democratic legitimacy thesis, and to push it towards the more fundamental discussion on international democratic legitimacy, let me conclude with a classification model of possible conceptions of democratic legitimacy of international law that might clarify the conceptual starting points of the scholars involved.
The different variations as explained in section 3 are not mutually exclusive. A universalistic approach towards the necessity for the democratic legitimation of international law does not exclude an institutionalist approach 134 Jeremy Waldron, 'All We Like Sheep ' (1999) towards the types of manifestations of democratic legitimation focusing primarily on participation through votes, or on the identification of equal, individual, political agents that sporadically have the opportunity to decide who will represent them. 136 In contrast, other universalist-oriented scholars might look at specific informal elements of democratic legitimacy in isolation. 137 Furthermore, a non-institutionalist scholar, with a focus on engagement, inclusiveness, and deliberative democracy, relying on the permanent opportunity to participate by all who are affected by the public decisions made, does not need to embrace an international (universalistic) account of democratic legitimacy. Model 1 illustrates the different possible syntheses between these three variations.
Let me apply this model to the debate on the NGO democratic legitimacy thesis. Given the arguments they use, one can conclude that most critics of the thesis feel disinclined to theorise democratic legitimacy in a context other than domestic democracy. This particularistic approach towards democratic legitimacy dismisses the NGO democratic legitimacy thesis in principle and insurmountably divides this group of scholars from the universalisticminded scholars (A/B). However, instead of acknowledging their particularistic mind frame in which no democratically legitimate international law exists, these critics often point towards the malfunctioning of NGOs, the fact that they are not representative, cannot be held accountable and not be allowed to disrupt international law-making in any way. Apart from this group of scholars which from a very fundamental level do not agree with the thesis, one can categorise four approaches to the democratic legitimacy of international law that are relevant in understanding the differences in scholarly appreciation of the validity of the NGO democratic legitimacy thesis.
As discussed, a multiform institutionalist approach (A1.1) proceeds from the idea that international law requires a different conception of democratic legitimacy than domestic law. State consent and state autonomy both remain the dominant pillars of the democratic legitimacy of international law. The contribution of NGOs to the democratic legitimacy of international law is considered complementary to the democratic legitimacy offered by the consent to new international norms of democratic states, thereby constituting a so-called 'two-track approach'. 138 In light of the debate as discussed in this article one can conclude that not many advocates of the NGO democratic legitimacy thesis feel attracted to this approach. Their inclination towards NGOs as contributors to the democratic legitimacy of international law has primarily been fuelled by criticism on the waning of state autonomy and by the normative weakness of state consent as a democratic tool. A uniform institutionalist approach (A1.2) to the thesis starts from the position that in order to democratically legitimize international law, the same institutional preconditions we are familiar with at the domestic level should be implemented in the international legal order. This approach is embedded in cosmopolitan democracy theory. 139 It shares its roots with the previous two-track approach, but it takes a uniform and institutionalist approach to democratic legitimacy's necessary global institutional manifestations for the democratic legitimacy of international law. This cosmopolitan approach requires the international legal order to be transformed into a political constellation, based on political rights, democratic institutions such as parliaments, and judicial safeguards, comparable to domestic democracies. Again, only a minority of the scholars engaged in the NGO democratic legitimacy thesis shares the ambition to establish a cosmopolitan democracy.
Whereas most critics take the particularistic approach (B) towards democratic legitimacy, the arguments presented by scholars favouring the NGO democratic legitimacy thesis predominantly point towards reasoning in line with universalist, non-institutionalist approaches to democratic legitimacy (A2). 140 Scholars whose work implicitly relies on a multiform non-institutionalist approach (A2.1) assume that the characteristics of international law-making require fundamentally different manifestations of democratic legitimacy than we are familiar with at the domestic level. Although at the domestic level institutional preconditions such as political rights and judicial safeguards might be necessary and suitable, at the international level, NGOs contribute to a non-institutional manifestation of the democratic legitimacy of international law. The concept of democratic legitimacy here is tailored specifically to the non-institutional characteristics and norms of the international legal order, such as transparency, deliberation, accountability, and inclusiveness. The difference with the multiform institutionalist approach (A1.1) is that this conception of democratic legitimacy of international law does not rely on state consent or domestic democracy. When scholars engaged in the NGO democratic legitimacy debate take a uniform non-institutionalist approach (A2.2), they argue that just as at the domestic level, non-institutional preconditions such as a well-functioning public sphere, and civil society, and democratic practices as deliberative practices, inclusion and openness are necessary and sufficient for the democratic legitimacy of law. In this respect, the activities of NGOs, presented as part of global civil society, form independent sources of democratic legitimacy. This approach is embedded in global deliberative democracy theory. 141 The impression is given that NGOs can directly democratically legitimize international law by contributing to global deliberative practices, transparency, accountability and control. Global deliberative practices are considered to enable democratic legitimation internationally, without requiring the backing of specific democratic institutional preconditions.
The classification offered here functions as an incentive for the scholars engaged in the debate on the NGO democratic legitimacy thesis to be more explicit about their theoretical assumptions. In addition to the intrinsic importance of a transparent discussion, this model would lead to a more fundamental discussion on what is expected of the democratic legitimacy of international law. This should, notwithstanding its complexity, precede any debate in which the NGOs and their actions form the centre stage or contention. Otherwise, the normative validations of NGO participation in international law float uneasily on conceptions of democratic legitimacy whose classification is always in flux between the participants. More importantly, if we do not share the same standards while assessing the acceptability of the exercise of international authority, democratic legitimacy as an evaluative tool loses its distinctive critical capacity. Ultimately, a watered-down conception of democratic legitimacy risks being captured by the dynamics of current power plays.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
